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Abstract
This article takes a strategic narrative approach to explaining the current and likely future contestation between Russia
and the West. We argue that Russia projects a strategic narrative that seeks to reinforce Russia’s global prestige and au-
thority, whilst promoting multilateral legal and institutional constraints on the other more powerful actors, as a means
to ensure Russia stays among the top ranking great powers. To illustrate this we analyze Russia’s identity narratives, inter-
national system narratives and issue narratives present in policy documents and speeches by key players since 2000. This
enables the identification of remarkably consistency in Russia’s narratives and potential points of convergence with West-
ern powers around commitment to international law and systemic shifts to an increasingly multipolar order. However, we
explain why the different meanings attributed to these phenomena generate contestation rather than alignment about
past, present and future global power relations. We argue that Russia’s historical-facing narratives and weakened material
circumstances have the potential to hamper its adaptation to rapid systemic change, and to make attempts to forge closer
cooperation with third parties challenging.
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1. Introduction: Strategic Narratives of Order
Russian narratives of the international system serve as a
public deliberation on Russia’s role in the world, as a pro-
jection of state power, and as a means to exert persua-
sive force in international relations.Within Russia’s narra-
tive of the international system lie debates over Russia’s
post-Cold War role in the Euro-Atlantic area, and more
fundamental discussions concerning how power transi-
tion in the world will affect Russia’s position in it. Strate-
gic narratives are a means to seek to shape conditions
to be conducive to Russian political, economic and secu-
rity interests—and these narratives are in turn defined by
material conditions. However, strategic narratives go be-
yond expressions of material interests. They are a core
component of the Russian state itself—shaping its own
self-conception and setting expectations on Russia’s role
in the world and how it should be recognised. This es-
say argues that Russia projects a strategic narrative that
seeks to reinforce Russia’s global prestige and authority,
whilst promoting multilateral legal and institutional con-
straints on the othermore powerful actors, as ameans to
ensure Russia stays among the top ranking great powers.
This narrative of international order has been largely con-
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sistent since the turn of the 21st century, corresponding
to Vladimir Putin’s tenure as President and Prime Minis-
ter of the Russian Federation.
However, great power influence is not necessarily an
accurate image of how world order operates. The EU’s
rhetorical shift towards value pluralism in its dealings
with third parties, the uncertainties of US foreign pol-
icy under the Trump administration, and the increasing
voice of emerging powers in global governance all indi-
cate a shift to polycentrism, but not the kind envisaged
by Russia. A world in which some issues are handled re-
gionally, some intergovernmentally, and some with civil
society or corporations participating in decision-making
is a world of ‘variable geometry’ requiring a mutual re-
finement and flexibility of narratives across these do-
mains (Burke-White, 2015, p. 6). Instead of the UN Se-
curity Council P5 governing world affairs hierarchically,
akin to the ‘fixed geometry’ of the 19th Century Euro-
pean congress, it is likely that, structurally, 21st Cen-
tury governance will be more fluid, based around issue-
focused, regional and cross-regional coalitions. We ar-
gue it will be easier for the EU and NATO to adapt their
narratives of the international system to this material
situation as they invest considerable effort in project-
ing strategic narratives of the evolving international sys-
tem as a means to influence its emergence and shape
it to their material interests. Russia’s historically-facing
narrative could well prove out of step with the systemic
change underway. It will be especially difficult for Rus-
sia to become a ‘good citizen’ and play a constructive
role (cf. Lo, 2015), despite Russian leaders’ statements
concerning shared responsibility for transnational prob-
lems. Nevertheless, our concern remains that all sides
must seek some narrative convergence for cooperation
to be possible at all.
This article deploys the concept of strategic narra-
tive. We define strategic narratives as ‘a means by which
political actors attempt to construct a shared meaning
of the past, present, and future of international poli-
tics to shape the behavior of domestic and international
actors’ (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, & Roselle, 2017, p. 6).
Within the literature, political narratives focus on time se-
quence (Shenav, 2006), the projection of a past–present–
future structure, some attempt at resolution, and a no-
tion that events are connected in non-random and possi-
bly causal, or at least explicable, manner. Further, draw-
ing on Kenneth Burke’s work we examine the interac-
tion between agency and narrative—howpeople use lan-
guage to act (1966)—in this case, how Russian elites
draw on narratives to exert influence. Narratives contain
a pentad of components: character or actors (agent); set-
ting/environment/space (scene); conflict or action (act);
tools/behavior (agency); resolution/or suggested resolu-
tion/goal (purpose). We focus on these components in
our analysis of Russia’s strategic narrative of the interna-
tional system as a means to illustrate attempts by Rus-
sian actors to influence current events, narrate Russia’s
role in the world and seek to shape emerging concep-
tions of the international system.
Strategic narratives in international affairs come in
three interconnected forms. First, narratives of the inter-
national systemoutline how theworld is structured, who
the main players are, and how the system should func-
tion (Bially Mattern, 2005; Hurrell, 2005; Miskimmon &
O’Loughlin, 2017). Second, identity narratives shape per-
ceptions of what is appropriate for a state to do in any
given context. Finally, policy narratives outline how an
actor views the appropriate response to address a politi-
cal challenge or crisis and articulates a position based on
material interest, and/or, what is might be a normatively
desirable outcome. In today’s interconnected world, pol-
icy narratives often compete within complex multilateral
contexts, but if successful, can forge consensus between
disparate positions. This article primarily addresses sys-
tem narratives but they cannot be understood in isola-
tion from the identity and policy narratives they interact
and intersect with.
The final aspect of strategic narrative analysis is a
focus on the nexus between international relations and
communication through understanding the processes of
formation, projection and reception of narratives. As we
shall see in the analysis to follow, news media can am-
plify and reinforce narrative mis-alignment. Most re-
cently, this takes the form of US and European media
projecting an identity narrative of Russia as an intransi-
gent autocratic state and therefore, implicitly or explic-
itly, propagating a ‘New Cold War’ system narrative.
Our analysis will demonstrate that analysing Russian
narratives can only suggest superficial points of conver-
gence between Russia and the West,1 as a starting point
for debates about more fundamental conceptual differ-
ences which must be addressed before major disagree-
ments can be recognised and accounted for. Russian
leaders communicate about points of connection with
the West, yet have also been keen to stress Russian civ-
ilizational and cultural singularities. The West, however,
largely understands international law and democracy to
have universal normative and technical characteristics.
The Russian model of plural civilisations undermines the
possibility of a shared normative basis for institutions.
A failure to recognise that democracy, law and economic
freedom are essentially contested concepts marks a fail-
ure in the West to understand that alternative explana-
tions are structurally inevitable because of how concepts
work nationally and internationally (see for example,
Acharya, 2014; Callahan, 2008; Mishra, 2017). Kupchan
argues that rather than follow the existing order, rising
powers will seek to revise that order (2012, p. 7). This
rapidly changing picture has the potential to impose sig-
nificant adaptation costs on powerful states. But as Lo
(2015) argues, Russia’s understanding of these concepts
and the translation of them in to institutions and actions
is not fit for today’s global diffusion of power (cf. Slaugh-
ter, 2005, 2017).
1 The West is a contested term. For a more thoughtful discussion of the term’s genealogy and uses, see Gow (2005) and Hellmann and Herborth (2016).
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Since Wendt’s (1999) assertion that international or-
der was constructed and not given, there has been sig-
nificant interest in how order is manufactured and devel-
oped in international affairs. In her book Power in Con-
cert,Mitzen (2013) argues that the emergence of concert
diplomacy in the 19th Century established public com-
mitments to self-restraint and collective problem-solving.
Whilst the Concert of Europe ultimately collapsed, it sug-
gested a blueprint for future generations of diplomats
concerning the possibility for diplomacy to mitigate in-
stability in global order. Creating order requires narrative
work. Order is an idea that has evolved over time, taking
new forms and involving different shapers through the
course of history. Historian David Armitage suggests that
‘what humans have invented, they may well yet disman-
tle; that what intellectual will has enshrined, an equal
effort of imaginative determination can dethrone’ (Ar-
mitage, 2017, p. 11). This is central to our understanding
of how global order and narrative intersect.
After the initial post-war period during which there
was the potential for cooperation, Russia and the West
can now more easily be drawn into the old binary imagi-
nary. Risse (2011, p.603) argues:
the world of 2010 still resembles the cold war and its
end. The main structuring forces are still ideas and
discourses. The only difference is that the world is
no longer structured along only two competing dis-
courses, Western liberalism and Eastern communism.
Manymore ideas now fight for attention and compete
for persuasive power. And this must not be bad for in-
ternational order. The transatlantic community—and
the scholarly community, too—just need to get used
to it. Whether the ideational plurality results in a ma-
terially multipolar order with many power-balancing
centers or in a more pluralistic but still multilateral or-
der, remains to be seen. In the end, it is still a world
‘of our (discursive) making’. (Onuf, 1989)
The strategic narrative framework can explain that how
the international system is understood directly effects
how the international order functions. Examining how
different actors project and contest narratives of the in-
ternational system highlights how existing and emerging
powers seek to impose a shared meaning of how inter-
national order does, or should, function. At this point
of rapid systemic change, the major point of debate is
the issue of recognition, rather than domination and re-
distribution. This is particularly so for Russia; recogni-
tion is a powerful theme running through its foreign pol-
icy narrative.
What follows is a breakdown of Russia’s strategic nar-
rative of the international system, Russia’s identity and
role within this desired system, and the policy prescrip-
tions it privileges. The narratives are drawn from for-
eign policy documents and speeches by key players since
2000 focusing on Russia’s global strategy and security
policy (on the utility of analyzing Russian foreign policy
texts, see Dyson & Parent, 2017). After an initial pars-
ing for Burke’s pentad to identity narrative components,
in this article we highlight narratives pertaining to Rus-
sia’s international system narrative. This encompasses
projections of prestige, equality and mutual respect be-
tween Russia and the West, a narrative purporting to re-
ject stereotypes of the West and Russia, narratives of
polycentrism and multipolarity, narratives of normative
diversity, narratives of order based on international law,
and finally, narratives of the Common European Home
which draws a clear line to negotiations at the end of the
Cold War which included Russia at the top table of Euro-
pean order. Following Roselle’s (2006, 2017) analysis of
Russia’s strategic narrative, we argue that narrative diver-
gence is complicating the emergence of narrative align-
ment on system narratives. This significance of this find-
ing is to explain why the opportunity for cooperation be-
tween the West and Russia on policies that would forge
closer cooperation have become increasingly difficult.
2. Russia’s Consistent System Narrative
There has been considerable interest in the targeted
use of strategic communication in Russia foreign pol-
icy, most notably in Ukraine since 2014. This is largely
tactics-focused and ignores discussions onRussian strate-
gic narratives and the Kremlin’s wider efforts to shape
a conducive international context for Russian foreign
and domestic interests. The themes in Russia’s strate-
gic narrative of global and regional order since 2000
have been consistent. These themes include demands
for recognition of Russia’s standing in the world by the
West, the stressing of pan-European cooperation under
the Common European Home narrative, and a stress on
the emergence of a new world order based on polycen-
trism, which will be discussed in more detail below. Jutta
Weldes’ idea of a ‘security imaginary’ is useful in this
regard, understood as a, ‘structure of well-established
meanings and social relations out of which representa-
tions about the world of international relations are cre-
ated’ (Weldes, 1999, p. 10). Drawing on Weldes, Stefano
Guzzini (2016) argues that the resurgence of geopolitics,
with its spatial logic, serves as a means to cope with the
anxiety caused by the end of the Cold War in the iden-
tities of actors in Europe. Russian elites have drawn on
a defined security imaginary as a response to Russia’s
identity crisis following the end of the Cold War and the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. How actors use narra-
tives is central to this. The consistency of the narration
of Russia’s environment, and its role within it, serves as
ameans to reinforce Russia’s post-ColdWar identity. This
largely historically-facing narrative of the international
system provides the basis on which Russia, in debates
with the West, seeks to reinforce itself domestically and
how it justifies its actions internationally (Cadier & Light,
2015; McDonald, 2007).
We argue that events in Ukraine are at least as much
symptom as the cause of tensions between Russia and
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 111–120 113
the West. A major underlying issue is a failure of Russia
and the West to reach a common understanding of the
international system. Russia has been coherent in how
it has narrated its position in the world, and consistent
in its view of international order and its desired relation-
ship with the West—even as, Bobo Lo (2015) contends,
the Kremlin narrative rests on a misunderstanding of its
role in the world and of how shifts in the international
system affect Russia (Stent, 2015). Russian strategic nar-
rative consistency rests on the eternal dilemma of polit-
ical elites in international affairs—whether to be driven
by a realistic response to emerging events, or to strive
for what they seek as what should be. The post-ColdWar
order in Europe has emerged from debates in the imme-
diate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and have
been reinforced by the enlargement of NATO and the EU
to the borders of the former Soviet Union area. Legro
(2005) suggests that at major critical junctures in interna-
tional affairs states are faced with decisions on whether
to adapt to new circumstances or consider alternative
policy options. Rather than being a co-constitutor of this
emerging system, since the early 1990s Russia has com-
plained of being excluded from the major decisions af-
fecting it. As time has passed, Kremlin frustration at this
exclusion has triggered increasingly assertive action on
their part, most notably in Ukraine, to unilaterally defend
what it perceives to be in its vital national interest.
However, the intensity of the narratives has in-
creased along with the stakes as the international sys-
tem evolves. Narratives on Russia from outside the Rus-
sian Federation have often been used to reinforce Rus-
sia’s perceived weakness vis-à-vis the West or power-
ful rising powers such as China. Former United States
President Barack Obama sought to paint Russia as a
weakened power, despite efforts by Putin to assert Rus-
sia’s strength. In a wide-ranging interview in The Atlantic,
Obama argued that Putin is
constantly interested in being seen as our peer and
as working with us, because he’s not completely
stupid. He understands that Russia’s overall position
in the world is significantly diminished. And the fact
that he invades Crimea or is trying to prop up As-
sad doesn’t suddenly make him a player. You don’t
see him in any of these meetings out here helping to
shape the agenda. For that matter, there’s not a G20
meeting where the Russians set the agenda around
any of the issues that are important. (Obama in Gold-
berg, 2016)
Conversely, there is a significant literature and policy dis-
cussion driven by concerns that the Russian Federation
poses a real risk to regional and global security, and to
the interests of theWest. Legvold (2017, p. 1026; see also
Legvold, 2016) argues that Russia is intent on challeng-
ing the existing order and that the West has underesti-
mated its threat. Dimitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie
Moscow Center, argues that in order to avoid conflict
with Russia a more nuanced view of the nature of the
challenges is needed (Trenin, 2016). Trenin argues that
within Russia grievances against the West fall in to two
narratives: that theWest fails to recognise Russia’s contri-
bution towards ending the Cold War, and that the West
does not acknowledge Russia’s Great Power status. From
the West’s perspective, Russia’s actions in Crimea and
more broadly in Ukraine, and the perception that Rus-
sia has been operating significant information campaigns
against the West, have precipitated a Western need to
rethink its relations with the Russian Federation, which,
in Sperling and Webber’s (2016) analysis, has involved
a re-securitisation of relations, escalating the attendant
risks of re-creating a security dilemma between the two
sides. Narrative contestation of identities, views of re-
gional and global order and emerging policy develop-
ments have central to understanding the emergence of
the tensions now evident between the West and Russia
(Pantti, 2016).
On the surface, Russian and Western narratives con-
verge in highlighting the importance of international law,
democracy and the centrality of markets. Russian For-
eign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, suggests that
There’s no ideological differences as far as democratic
principles and market economy are concerned. Sec-
ond, these days, unlike the days of the Cold War, we
have much clearer common threats, like terrorism,
like chaos in theMiddle East, like the threat of the pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction. (as cited in
Saunders, 2017).
They face common threats which incentivise coopera-
tion due to their transnational nature. From this perspec-
tive there appear to bemajor incentives for Russia to play
an active role in tackling these threats and maintaining
the pillars of international order. There is a flip side, how-
ever: Russia’s expectation that, in playing a cooperative
role in maintaining the architecture of the international
system and addressing systemic threats, Russia will be
considered a partner by the West and emerging powers.
However, divergence on the meaning of the core pillars
of the system—law, democracy and markets—pinpoints
where the challenges for communication exist. Those
outside Russia may simply not believe Lavrov when he
says Russia’s ideological affinity to ‘democratic principles’
reflects the same affinity in the West, for instance. This
drives a cycle of mis-communication, embedding frus-
tration on all sides (Hill, 2016). The result is moves to-
wards meaningful shared governance and convergence
only deepen that frustration. There is superficial conver-
gence in the public narratives Russia projects, but this
masks significant differences resting on contested under-
standing of core concepts of sovereignty and hierarchy in
the international system.
The reception of Russia’s narrative has been viewed
differently in the US, triggering debates regarding com-
peting policy responses. This reinforces our argument
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that conceptual differences matter. Let us point to four
within the US. Rudolf (2016) highlights three schools in
the US discussion on Russia. First, a neo-containment
school which argues that a more authoritarian Moscow
will pursue an expansionist policy. Second, the mecha-
nistic school—Russia is acting like a great power vis-à-
vis its periphery, which should mean that the US and
its partners respond more robustly to Russian actions.
Third, an interactionist school that argues both sides are
to blame for recent tensions and should work to forge
closer cooperation. Each of these entails a narrative, pro-
jecting a past, present and possible futures. Addition-
ally, fourth, on the global level, demands for Russian
andChinese spheres of influence counter theUS-led con-
ception of a liberal order based on integration into the
existing global economy (Ikenberry, 2009). Acceptance
of such a narrative would mean that the US will either
have to live with this, or challenge this—which could
lead to escalation.
Media ecology matters here too: The reception of
Russia’s foreign policy narrative in the US is complicated,
Tsygankov (2017) argues, by newsmedia which reinforce
binary relationship between theUS–Russia as ameans to
reassert US identity and global presence. Analysis of Eu-
ropean newsmedia shows the same has happened since
2014 (Ojala, Pantti, & Kangas, 2017). The representation
of Moscow as a neo-Soviet autocracy ignores alternative
understandings of Russia in US media. This purposively
juxtaposes a more inferior Russian identity with a supe-
rior American one. Tsygankov adds that the centralisa-
tion of Russian governance could be interpreted ameans
to address significant domestic and international chal-
lenges, rather than the portrayal of an autocratic state.
Tsygankov argues:
The presentation of Russia as an abusive autocracy
is a way to promote a particular image of democ-
racy within a global competition over the power to
shape information and generate ideas. In this brave
new digital age, media, more than ever, are a critical
tool of global governance and soft power. (Tsygankov,
2017, p. 31)
In summary, there are consistent aspects of how Russia
and its elites narrate Russia’s identity, its position (and
grievances) within the post-ColdWar order, and its vision
for a future Great Power-ledmultipolar system. However,
these narrative elements are not straightforwardly recog-
nised outside Russia, particularly in the US; as Tsygankov
suggests, what for Putin is the necessary consolidation of
domestic governance appears, externally, as the actions
of an autocratic and therefore problematic state (for ex-
ample assassinating or jailing political opponents and in-
vading neighbouring states). We now turn to an analysis
of Russia’s main strategic narratives which are central to
Russian foreign policy and Vladimir Putin’s conception of
regional and global order.
3. Narratives of Recognition: The Prestige, Equality and
Mutual Respect Narrative
Central to understanding Russia’s narrative of the inter-
national system is the role of great powers working in
concert, an elite group of states reinforcing a hierarchy
to which Russia claims membership. In the National Se-
curity Concept (NSC) of the 10 January 2000 (NSC, 2000)
Russia’s status in the world is placed central to its for-
eign policy narrative and narrative of global order. The
NSC 2000 states that, ‘Russia is one of the world’s ma-
jor countries, with a centuries-old history and rich cul-
tural traditions’ (NSC, 2000) This claim to great power
status is reinforced in the Foreign Policy Concept (FPC)
of 28 June 2000, highlighting its position as one of the
largest Eurasian powers. The FPC 2000 is ladenwith iden-
tity narrative claims signalling Russian responsibility to
play an active role in solving international challenges, on
a regional and global level. The FPC 2000 proposes that,
‘the Russian Federation has a real potential for ensuring
itself a worthy place in the world’. The document also
outlines that Russia is a ‘reliable partner’, that it plays a
‘constructive role’ in resolving problems and that its for-
eign policy is ‘balanced’ due to its geopolitical situation.
The FPC 2000 also asserts Russia’s independence, prag-
matism and transparency, taking into account ‘legitimate
interests of other states and [Russia] is aimed at seeking
joint decisions’. The NSC 2000 and FPC 2000 both high-
light the centrality of Russia’s demand for recognition.
In a speech to the Russian International Affairs Coun-
cil in June 2014, Lavrov presented the Ukraine crisis as a
chance to clear the air and to focus on the modalities of
what recognition of Russian concerns and status should
involve. Lavrov hoped
the current crisis will become a kind of ‘refreshing
storm’, which will help to transfer our relations with
western partners to healthier and fairer foundations
(probably not at once). It will probably have less tor-
menting discussions about the search for general val-
ues and more recognition of the right to be different,
more aspirations to build relations on firm founda-
tions of equality, mutual respect and consideration of
each other’s interests. (Lavrov, 2014b)
The FPC of 30 November 2016 is more explicit in outlin-
ing a narrative of recognition and reinforces the more as-
sertive trajectory of Russia’s foreign policy narrative ev-
ident particularly after the 1999 Kosovo War and 2003
Iraq War. These were viewed as being evidence of the
West’s disregard for international law, the sovereignty of
states and a deliberate attempt to sideline Russia. The
FPC 2016 puts the consolidation of the ‘Russian Federa-
tion’s position as a centre of influence in today’sworld’ at
the centre of Russian foreign policy (FPC, 2016, para. 3c).
The mutual recognition and respect narrative of Russian
foreign policy has developed over time. It was some-
thing Russia aspired to on the basis of the sleight felt
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by the West’s expansion in Europe and move to an inter-
ventionist foreign policy, and as something to aspire to
as Russian foreign policy recovered from the collapse of
the Soviet Union in the 1990s. In recent years, the nar-
rative has taken on a more conditional element: Russia
demands recognition as a precondition for cooperation.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has repeatedly
used this conditional narrative of recognition in his public
pronouncements. In a 2014 interview Lavrov stated that,
‘It is evident that the transfer to a brand new, higher level
of partnershipmay be reached only on the basis of equal-
ity, mutual respect and consideration of each other’s in-
terests’ (Lavrov, 2014a, Kommersant). Lavrov’s speech to
the 2017 Munich Security Policy conference reinforced
this recognition narrative when outlining his view of US–
Russian relations: ‘We want relations based on pragma-
tism, mutual respect, and understanding of our special
responsibility for global stability’ (Lavrov, 2017).
4. Narratives of Inclusion and Exclusion: The Common
European Home
A second core Russian strategic narrative is that of the
Common European Homewhich expresses decades-long
resentments over the failure to fully include Russia in
the post-Cold War European order. Symptomatic of the
West’s rejection of the Common European Home narra-
tive is Russia’s exclusion not only from western institu-
tions, but also in debates concerning the growing mem-
bership of NATO and the EU and its impact on Russia’s
regional interests. Exclusion has been a common nar-
rative in Russian foreign policy documents and public
speeches since the 1990s. This has also been reflected in
analysis by a minority of western actors who seek to un-
derstand Russia’s opposition to EU and NATO expansion
(Kissinger, 2014; McGwire, 1998). Russian foreign policy
documents call for indivisible security (FPC, 2016, para.
27d) rather than institutionalised demarcation in Europe.
Putin’s 2007Munich Security Conference speech is often
referred to as the beginning of a substantive change in
policy narrative, calling for a restructuring of security co-
operation on the global level (Putin, 2007). Former Pres-
ident Medvedev’s call for a New Security Architecture in
2008 is further evidence of a more pessimistic view in
Russia of the possibility of establishing closer collabora-
tion with the West in security and defence policy. Yet
despite the change in policy narrative to a more criti-
cal stance towards the West signalled by Medvedev and
Putin, the core claim for inclusion in decisions on Eu-
ropean regional order remained central to Russia’s sys-
tem narrative.
The exclusion of Russia from meaningful European
security policy discussions has been reinforced by EU and
NATO narratives on European security. From the EU and
NATO’s perspective, Russia’s destabilising foreign policy
actions in the region have contradicted the Russian gov-
ernment’s Common European Home narrative, reinforc-
ing the West’s scepticism stance on the potential for
greater cooperation. The oppositional stances taken by
Russia and theWest based on differentmaterial interests
limit the scope for a strategic narrative to emerge which
might forge common ground. Since the 2014 Ukraine
crisis, the EU has undergone protracted periods of self-
reflection on its relations with Russia. The EU’s Global
Strategy of 2016 and NATO’s Newport (2014) and War-
saw (2016) summit declarations have signalled the limits
of EU/NATO–Russia cooperation in the context of contin-
ued tensions over Crimea and the Donbass region. This
has been reinforced by tensions over Russia’s support of
Assad in Syria. The identity, system and policy narratives
of the EU and NATO are now firmly excluding Russia from
significant cooperation, stating explicitly that Russia is no
longer a strategic partner. The identity and system narra-
tives of the EU and NATO are framed as counter to Rus-
sia’s narrative. This context leaves little room to forge
an inclusive Common European Home narrative and rein-
forces the divisible security architecture it purports to op-
pose. We set out these competing narratives in Table 1.
We re-emphasise that while there is superficial con-
vergence on key concepts—the primacy of international
law and the emergence of a polycentric or multipolar
order, for instance—the normative foundations for any
cooperation are weak because of differing meanings at-
tributed to these concepts. The EU and, to an extent
NATO, emphasise universal values policed by the inter-
national community, while Russia emphasises the univer-
sal value of sovereignty, the primacy of great powers in
enforcing international law, and a plurality of normative
orders or civilisations, as illustrated in the final section.
5. Multipolarity and Polycentrism: Re-Ordering the
World Narrative
The third core narrativewhich is consistent in Russian for-
eign policy has been the promotion of the emergence of
a polycentric world order. Russia’s 2000 FPC stressed a
narrative of multipolarity and the dangers of unilateral-
ism. It committed Russia to working towards, ‘a multi-
polar system of international relations that really reflects
the diversity of the modem world with its great variety
of interests’. More recently, reinforcing a narrative of
global change is a means to challenge the systemic dom-
inance of the US and position Russia as a shaper of this
new world order (FPC, 2013, para. 3). Russia’s narrative
stresses the relative decline of the West and the rise of
the rest. The 2013 FPC stated, ‘The ability of the West
to dominate world economy and politics continues to di-
minish. The global power and development potential is
now more dispersed and is shifting to the East, primar-
ily to the Asia-Pacific region’ (FPC, 2013, para. 6). Putin’s
2014 speech to the Valdai International Forum highlight
the dangers of ‘unipolar domination’.
The EU sharesmuch of the same order narrative. The
EU Global Strategy outlines a narrative of the world as a
‘complex world of global power shifts and power diffu-
sion’ (European Union, 2016, p. 16). This order narrative
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Table 1. EU, NATO and Russian narratives of identity, order and issues.
Identity System Policy
EU New identity narrative of an
emerging global player;
Ever closer union;
Demonstrates by example the
benefits of democracy and
human rights.
World characterized by demands of
interdependence;
Relations with others central to
stability, based on partnership;
Founded on governance, rule of
law, democracy, human rights;
World increasingly contested and
complex—alternative narratives
emerging which should be
challenged.
Comprehensive Approach;
Promoting interests and universal
values;
Russia undermining freedom,
sovereignty security and minority
rights;
Strategic competition with BRICS;
Russian aggression in Ukraine;
Russia acting illegally;
Russian hybrid war;
Russia no longer a ‘strategic
partner’.
NATO Defender of freedom and
security;
Proves its worth in the Cold War,
needs to continue proving it.
Open, rules-based system founded
on sovereignty and territorial
integrity;
System increasingly defined by
chaos and new threats.
Russian rejection of post-Cold War
order;
Russia waging undeclared war in
Ukraine;
Russian hybrid war;
Russia no longer a ‘strategic
partner’.
Russia Global Player;
Civilization with heritage of
culture and science;
Excluded and badly treated by
the West.
New for a Common European
Home—A common economic and
humanitarian space (Putin);
Europe less central to world
order—emergence of BRICS;
Return of East/West confrontation
in Europe;
Polycentric world order;
International order should have a
legal framework.
Western media propagating new
Cold War narrative;
EU/NATO not respecting freedom of
Ukrainian people;
Absence of strategic trust in
EU/Russia relations;
EU exaggerates friend/foe narrative;
Sanctions unjust, not merited.
Coup d’état in Ukraine supported by
outsiders;
West provocation and flouting of
international law;
Russia helping Ukraine overcome
crisis.
portrays the EU as an upholder of values in aworldwhere
not all states share its views—as the Russian narrative of
international law has stressed for many years. The EU’s
response has been to seek a more common foreign pol-
icy despite Brexit and the complexities of speaking with
one voice. For McFarlane, Russia is determined to play a
‘holding game’ until the conditions emerge for it to play
a more prominent role in a pluralist international system
(McFarlane, 2006, p. 57). The timeline for such a hold-
ing game could be extensive. A recent report by the Rus-
sian International Affairs Council argues that the process
of moving to a new multipolar international order has
stalled due to the unexpectedly strong US recovery after
the 2008 financial crisis (Luzyanin et al., 2016, p. 6). Lo’s
critique of Russia’s stance of multipolarity suggests that
Russia’s holding game may never end. He argues
There are few signs…that the Putin regime has come
to terms with the ‘inconvenient truths’ of the new
world disorder. It continues to frame the landscape
of contemporary politicswithin an artificialmultipolar
(polycentric) paradigm. It overestimates Russia’s ca-
pacity to establish itself as a regional and global player
on its own narrow terms. And it believes that the fu-
ture lies not in adapting to fast-changing international
realities, but in hunkering down—reaffirming time-
honored principles of Russian foreign policy, such as
the primacy of great power diplomacy and military
strength. (Lo, 2015, p. 67)
States must be willing to adjust their conceptualisations.
The EU has shifted, at least rhetorically, towards value
pluralism in their dealings with third parties. This is rou-
tine in contemporary international affairs. China too has
adapted its concept of sovereignty as ‘non-intervention’
for African audiences in response to African fears of ex-
ploitation, for instance (Keuleers, 2016). This is aworld of
‘variable geometry’ governance, in which states must co-
partner, mutually adjust and be open to new forms and
relations of power (Burke-White, 2015, p. 6). Certainly,
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rhetorical accommodation is easier from a position of
material strength and security; without those, Russia can
only challenge by projecting its consistent narrative in
the hope it might finally not be mis-recognised, it can
get mired in contesting every crime or norm violation it
is accused of (MH17), or it can take military risks. How-
ever, because of more fundamental conceptual differ-
ences, its communications will intensify mutual frustra-
tion. The UN Security Council will not and cannot simply
govern world affairs like 19th Century great powers, with
Russia at the table with its own sphere of influence.
6. Conclusion
We have charted Russia’s 21st Century foreign policy nar-
ratives, compared them to debates in the US and to EU
and NATO policy documents, and pointed to a failure
of Russia and the West to reach a common understand-
ing of the emerging international system. Consistency
of the Russian narrative indicates that in spite of the
current fixation with disinformation and Russian-led in-
formation warfare, Russia has been coherent in how it
has narrated its position in the world, drawing on a ‘se-
curity imaginary’ which sets limits on how much scope
for adaptation in Russia’s narrative of international or-
der there is. We have highlighted that Russia’s strategic
narrative of the international system is underpinned by
its identity narrative and this plays out in how it nar-
rates its policy preferences or its view of the Ukraine cri-
sis. However, shared language concerning commitment
to international law and multipolarity cannot disguise
competing meanings attributed to these words within
Russia and the West, making narrative convergence dif-
ficult. Without such alignment, it is impossible for all
parties to reach an alignment in narrating the recent
past, present problems, and the future world order that
they must, somehow, govern and manage together. In
particular, Russia feels mis-recognised, but articulates a
vision of world order that appears unsuited to the dy-
namics of 21st century power, shifting hierarchies and
material conditions. Since 2000 this mis-alignment has
driven a cycle of mis-communication, generating frustra-
tion on all sides and restricting the scope for cooperation.
It has also sparked policy responses which espouse rela-
tive gains over forging collective agreements. The crisis
in Ukraine can be interpreted as an opportunistic Rus-
sian action in the absence of a shared narrative of the
European space in which Russia believes it is recognised
and is seen to mutually gain from cooperation with the
EU andNATO. But this is not simply a direct disagreement
on crises such asUkraine. It is reflective of competing and
currently unresolved narratives of world order, which fur-
ther divergence can only harden.
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